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T

he Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has suffered
from many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions
that have done in so many lenders
during the 2000s. It too was harmed
by a housing market as bad as any
seen since the Great Depression.
As a result, the federal government
announced in 2013 that the FHA
would require the irst bailout in its
history. Margaret Chadbourn, U.S.
Federal Housing Administration to Tap
$1.7 Bln in Taxpayer Funds, Reuters,
Sept. 27, 2013, http://reuters.com/
article/usa-housingbailout-idUSW1N0G702P20130927. At the same
time that it faced these inancial challenges, the FHA came under attack
for poor execution of some of its
policies attempting to expand homeownership opportunities.
Leading commentators have
called for the federal government to
stop employing the FHA to do anything other than provide liquidity
to the low end of the mortgage market. These critics’ arguments rely on
a couple of examples of programs
that were clear failures, but they fail
to address the FHA’s long history
of undertaking comparable initiatives. In fact, the FHA has a history of
successfully conducting new homeownership programs. The FHA does
have operational laws, however, that
should be addressed to prevent them
from reoccurring if the FHA were to
undertake similar homeownership
initiatives in the future.
This article examines the criticism
that has been leveled at FHA and the
goals the agency should pursue. For
David Reiss is a professor of law at Brooklyn
Law School in Brooklyn, New York.

a more thorough treatment of this topic by the author, see
the author’s law review article on the
subject. David Reiss, Underwriting
Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal
Housing Administration and the Low
Down Payment Loan, 50 Ga. L. Rev.
1019 (2016).
Introduction to the FHA
Mortgage insurance is a product that
is paid for by the homeowner but
protects the lender if the homeowner
defaults on the mortgage. The insurer
pays the lender for the losses that it
suffers from any default by the homeowner. Mortgage insurance typically
is required for borrowers with limited funds for down payments. Gen.
Accounting Ofice, GAO/RCED96-123, Homeownership: FHA’s Role
in Helping People Obtain Home Mortgages 16 (1996), http://www.gao.
gov/archive/1996/rc96123.pdf. The
FHA provides mortgage insurance
for mortgage loans on single family and multifamily homes and is the
world’s largest government mortgage
insurer. Other signiicant providers are the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) and private companies,
known as private mortgage insurers
(PMIs). Mortgage insurance makes
homeownership possible for many
households that would otherwise
not be able to meet the underwriting
requirements of lenders.
As with much of the federal housing infrastructure, the FHA has
its roots in the Great Depression.
National Housing Act, Pub. L. No.
73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934). The private mortgage insurance industry,
like many others, was devastated in
the early 1930s. Its companies began
to fail as almost half of all mortgages
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in the nation
defaulted. The FHA was
created to replace the PMI industry, which remained dormant for
decades.
Housing markets faced problems
in the Great Depression that were
similar in kind to those encountered
in the late 2000s. These problems
included rapidly falling housing
prices, widespread unemployment
and underemployment, rapid tightening of credit, and, as a result of
these trends, much higher rates of
default and foreclosure. The FHA
noted in its second annual report that
the “shortcomings of the old system
need no recital. It inanced extensive
overselling of houses at inlated values, to borrowers unable to pay for
them . . . .” U.S. Fed. Hous. Admin.,
Second Ann. Rep. Fed. Housing Admin.
28 (1936). Needless to say, the same
could be said of our most recent
housing bust.
Over its lifetime, the FHA has
insured more than 40 million
mortgages, helping to make homeownership available to a broad swath
of American households. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev., Annual Report to
Congress Regarding the Financial Status
of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund Fiscal Year 2014 (2014), at
60. And indeed, the FHA mortgage
has been essential to America’s transformation from a nation of renters to
a nation of homeowners. Kenneth T.
Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States 205
(1985). The early FHA created the
modern American housing inance
system, as well as the look and feel
of post-war suburban communities

n
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because of the construction standards it set for the new houses that it
insured. Id. at 205, 215.
The FHA also had many other missions over the course of its existence
and a mixed legacy to match. The
FHA’s role changed, beginning in the
1950s, from serving the entire mortgage market to focusing on speciic
segments of it. This changed mission
had a major effect on everything the
FHA did, including how it underwrote mortgage insurance and for
whom it did so.
The Failures of the FHA
The FHA is an understudied topic,
despite having a massive effect on
the built environment of the United
States. The neglect is particularly
unfortunate because the FHA has had
some severe failures that mar its long
history of success as a provider of
liquidity for, stability in, and access

The FHA’s role
changed, beginning
in the 1950s, from
serving the entire
mortgage market to
focusing on speciic
segments of it.

to the residential mortgage market.
Because of these shortcomings, the
leading commentators on the FHA
have judged its initiatives to encourage homeownership to be failures.
The absence of a vibrant and balanced scholarly exchange regarding
the FHA stands in the way of responsibly charting its future course.
In recent years, the FHA has come
under attack for its poor execution of
some of its attempts to expand homeownership opportunities, and leading
commentators have called for the federal government to stop assigning
such mandates to the FHA. See, e.g.,
Joseph Gyourko, Rethinking the FHA
1 (Am. Enter. Inst. 2013). They argue
that the FHA should focus on providing liquidity for the portion of the
mortgage market that serves low- and
moderate-income households. Edward
J. Pinto, How the FHA Hurts Working-Class Families and Communities 41
(Am. Enter. Inst. 2012). These critics
rely heavily on a couple of examples
of failed programs, such as the Section 235 program enacted as part of
the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968 and the American Dream
Downpayment Assistance Act of 2003.
These programs required tiny or
even nominal down payments. The
Section 235 program was enacted
in response to the riots that burned
through American cities in the
1960s. It was intended to expand
homeownership opportunities for
low-income households, particularly

African-American ones. The American Dream program also was geared
to increase homeownership among
lower-income and minority households. The crux of the critique of
these programs is that they failed to
ensure that borrowers had the capacity to repay their mortgages, leading
to bad results for the FHA and borrowers alike.
Notwithstanding these harmful
initiatives, the FHA has a parallel history of successfully undertaking new
homeownership programs. These
successes include programs for veterans returning home from World War
II, a mission that was later handed
off to the VA. At the same time, the
FHA has clearly suffered from operational failures over the course of its
existence that should be addressed in
the design of any future initiatives.
Unfortunately, the FHA has not really
grappled with its past failures as it
moves beyond the inancial crisis.
Robert Van Order and Anthony
Yezer, the authors of the FHA
Assessment Report, write that “the
lesson that we should take away
from” the FHA’s recent history of
looser underwriting standards is
that the “FHA, as currently organized, should not be used as an
experimental program to encourage
homeownership.” Robert Van Order
& Anthony Yezer, FHA Assessment
Report: The Role of the Federal Housing Administration in a Recovering
U.S. Housing Market 9 (George Washington University Center for Real
Estate and Urban Analysis June 2011),
https://creua.business.gwu.edu/
iles/2016/12/2obama-tkomqq.pdf.
They argue that this is nonetheless
unavoidable because “there are powerful political forces willing to push
FHA to allow very unsound lending practices.” Id. Given that Yezer is
the co-author of one of the handful of
comprehensive studies of the FHA,
this is a damning assessment indeed.
The few policy analysts who have
made a close study of the FHA agree
in the main with Yezer and the other
scholars who have given the FHA
their sustained attention. The American Enterprise Institute’s Edward
Pinto, the author of the FHA Watch,
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writes: “Government insurance programs suffer from three fundamental
laws: (1) the government cannot
successfully price for risk; (2) government backing distorts prices, resource
allocation, and competition; and
(3) political pressure and congressional demands for a quid pro quo
inevitably arise, politicizing the programs.” Edward J. Pinto, Truth in
Government Lending Is Long Overdue (Am. Enter. Inst. Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.aei.org/publication/
truth-in-government-lending-is-longoverdue/. Housing economist Joseph
Gyourko is more succinct, but equally
pessimistic: the FHA “has failed
by any reasonable metric.” Joseph
Gyourko, Rethinking the FHA (Am.
Enter. Inst. June 2013), http://images.
politico.com/global/2013/06/19/
gyourko_rethinking_the_fha-report_
online.pdf.
There is much to support these
characterizations of the FHA, but
they cherry-pick from the historical
record to make their cases, focusing on disastrous policies in the early
1970s and the 2000s. By failing to
address the FHA’s other initiatives
over its 80-plus years of operation,
these commentators fail to make a
convincing case that the FHA’s history is a one of failed government
action.
Van Order and Yezer’s policy prescription for the FHA is “that over
time the FHA should revert to its
previous role: helping irst-time and
low- to moderate-income homebuyers purchase homes, allowing the
private sector to shoulder more of the
risk associated with insuring larger
loans.” Van Order & Yezer, supra,
at 2. Van Order and Yezer, like other
commentators, tend to focus on just
one aspect of the FHA’s original mission—providing liquidity to a frozen
market—and bestow it with an essential quality: This is what the FHA truly
is about. The historical record, however, is much more complicated,
both at the FHA’s origin and over the
course of its long history.
Underwriting Sustainable
Homeownership
The modern FHA states that its

The modern FHA
states that its mission
is to serve borrowers
that the conventional
mortgage market does
not serve efectively: irsttime homebuyers as well
as “minorities, low-income
families and residents of
underserved communities.”

mission is to serve borrowers that
the conventional mortgage market
does not serve effectively: irst-time
homebuyers as well as “minorities,
low-income families and residents of
underserved communities.” U.S. Fed.
Hous. Admin., Ann. Mgmt. Rep. Fiscal
Year 2015, at 4. More concretely, right
after the inancial crisis, it set concrete
performance goals such as increasing
homeownership by insuring over 1.4
million single-family mortgages.
Sadly, it did not seem that the FHA
learned much from the inancial crisis. By having homeownership goals
drive its underwriting, it is bound to
repeat the iscal calamities of the past.
What is needed—what all commentators agree on—is for appropriate
underwriting to drive the FHA. This
is not to say that promoting homeownership for various groups is not
a legitimate goal. It is to say that if it
is not done in a way that avoids frequent defaults and foreclosures, it can
do more harm than good to the FHA
itself and the homeowners it claims
to serve.
An essential element of appropriate underwriting is the down
payment requirement, as expressed in
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Indeed,
there is a strong correlation between
low LTV and low default rates over
the FHA’s 80-plus year history. From
an underwriting perspective, a 20%
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down payment is great. It keeps
defaults very low. But it is very tough
for low- and moderate-income families to save enough money in a
reasonable amount of time to put
together a 20% down payment. The
median household income in 2014
was a bit more than $50,000. The
median existing home sales price in
2014 was around $200,000. It would
take quite some time for that median
household (let alone a low-income
household) to save the $40,000 necessary to have a 20% down payment on
that median house. Moreover, high
down payment requirements would
have a disproportionate effect on
communities of color, which tend to
have lower income and less wealth
than white households. There have
been periodic pushes to decrease
down payment requirements to
increase homeownership rates, but
those pushes have not included an
evaluation of the sustainability of that
increase.
To rationalize the FHA’s mission,
we must ensure that its underwriting practices make sense. There are
three generally agreed on goals for
FHA underwriting: (1) FHA insurance should not require support from
the public isc; (2) the FHA should
use lower-risk eligible borrowers
to cross-subsidize higher-risk eligible borrowers; and (3) the class of
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We should have
learned enough
from history to
know we cannot
will sustainable
homeownership
into existence.

eligible borrowers should be limited
to those with a reasonable likelihood
of not defaulting on their loans. These
three goals, taken together, relect
a view that the FHA’s long-term
health depends on it navigating longstanding political debates over the
“ownership society,” wealth redistribution, and consumer protection
regulation.
The irst goal, that FHA insurance
should not require support from the
public isc, has been part of the FHA’s
mission since its creation. The capital
has not received FHA’s recent inancial dificulties with sympathy. It is
hard, in this environment, to imagine
a politically feasible alternative to a
self-supporting FHA.
The second goal, that the FHA
should use lower-risk eligible borrowers to cross-subsidize higher-risk
eligible borrowers, has also been integral to the FHA since its founding.
Indeed, the FHA’s main program, the
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund,
was designed to be a form of mutual
insurance in which policyholders spread the risk of default among
themselves. This second goal also has
been a relatively noncontroversial one.
Surprisingly, the third goal—
ensuring that borrowers do not
default in high numbers—has been
given just lip service at various times
in the FHA’s history. The policy of
the FHA was sure to err on the side of

low defaults from the 1930s through
the 1950s. Starting in the 1960s, however, this approach was loosened up
and at times it was implicitly rejected
or ignored. This was seen with the
Section 235 iasco of the 1970s, as
well as the American Dream Downpayment Act debacle in the 2000s. It
appears that households and communities of color are most harmed
by such thoughtlessly loose underwriting criteria because they are
disproportionately represented
among homeowners affected by the
defaults and foreclosures from those
failed programs.
History teaches us that the goal of
sustainable homeownership should
not be ignored. It should be hewed
to closely to ensure the FHA’s viability. It also should be hewed to closely
for the sake of FHA-insured borrowers who should be able to rely on
FHA underwriting as a signal that
they will likely be able to afford their
housing payments and keep their
homes.
The FHA must work to identify a
down-payment requirement that balances access (therefore, no 20% down
payments) with sustainability (thus,
no 0% down payments). Academic
research is beginning to tease out
how low the FHA’s down payment
requirement can responsibly go: it
seems that programs can work in the
3%–5% range. But we should have

learned enough from history to know
we cannot will sustainable homeownership into existence—underwriting
matters and people must have the
capacity to maintain their mortgages as they deal with the slings and
arrows of fate, including unemployment, divorce, and poor health. If the
FHA does not take these into account,
too many homeowners will suffer
from the stresses of default, foreclosure, and eviction.
Conclusion
The FHA has been a versatile tool of
government since its creation during
the Great Depression. It was created
in large part to inject liquidity into a
moribund mortgage market. It has
since been repositioned to achieve
a variety of additional social goals,
some of which have not been realized. The FHA’s failed programs,
coupled with the recent inancial
woes of the FHA that resulted in a
government bailout, have fueled criticism of the institution. The FHA has
been more successful, however, in
achieving its broader goals than is
generally recognized. Nonetheless, its
mission still needs clariication and
its operations likewise need rationalization, if it is to assist the low- and
moderate-income borrowers it claims
to serve, not just to get a mortgage
but also to sustain it over the long
term. n

Published in Probate & Property, Volume 32, No 2 © 2018 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission.

24

n

MARCH/APRIL 2018 All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or
stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

RPTE PUBLICATIONS
All RPTE publications can be purchased on the ABA Web Store,
ShopABA.org, or by calling the Service Center, 800-285-2221.

The Lawyer’s Uncommon Guide to Commercial Leasing
By Sidney G. Saltz

There are many issues over and above reviewing and negotiating the contents of a leasing document that a
lawyer must take into account to complete a transaction. From the type of property involved to the various lease
provisions, an attorney needs to gain familiarity with them in order to be an effective advocate and counselor for
the client. Drawing on his years of experience as a commercial real estate lawyer, author Sidney G. Saltz shares
his knowledge and insights about the leasing process in this general guide for lawyers and law students.
Regular Price: $49.95 n RPTE Section member price: $39.95 n Product code: 5430778

A Guide to International Estate Planning:
Drafting, Compliance, and Administration Strategies, Second Edition
Leigh-Alexandra Basha, Editor

Identify and navigate the complex legal and tax planning and regulatory compliance issues involved in
international estate planning. In this comprehensive resource, attorneys with signiicant experience in
international issues explain the principles and procedures of international asset management as well as more
specialized topics. From an overview of the principles and procedures to proven strategies, techniques, and
practical applications, the authors consider key issues in the area and address evolving issues of importance
in planning with foreign jurisdictions.
Regular Price: $169.95 n RPTE Section member price: $149.95 n Product code: 5430661

The Sublease and Assignment Deskbook: Legal Issues, Forms, and Drafting
Techniques for Commercial Lease Transfers, Second Edition
Brent C. Shaffer, Editor

This authoritative deskbook considers speciic subleasing and assignment issues as well as case law in a
practical context. The authors offer pertinent strategies and drafting techniques for dealing with these problems.
The book and CD-ROM contain extensive form prime lease transfer clauses, subleases, assignments, and
recognition agreements, which are all based on actual documents contributed by experienced leasing attorneys.
Regular Price: $159.95 n RPTE Section member price: $129.95 n Product code: 5430628

Ethics in the Practice of Elder Law
By Roberta K. Flowers and Rebecca C. Morgan

Ethical issues can occur at any point when representing elderly clients. Offering clearly written guidance on the
most common of these issues, this guide provides a much-needed framework for recognizing and analyzing
the situation. The authors, both authorities in the area of elder law, discuss the most common ethical situations
encountered in practice and how to anticipate and address them. The book presents hypothetical situations in
each chapter, followed by opening questions and advice on analyzing and responding to the issue. It also explains
how to determine the questions to ask based on the 9 “C’s” of elder law ethics.
Regular Price: $99.95 n RPTE Section member price: $79.95 n Product code: 5430614

Published in Probate & Property, Volume 32, No 2 © 2018 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission.
All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or
stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

